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By CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS AND JOSEPH R. MASON*
The consequences of bank distress for the
economy during the Depression remain an area
of unresolved controversy. Since John M.
Keynes (1931) and Irving Fisher (1933), mac-
roeconomists have argued that bank distress
magnified the extent of the economic decline
during the Depression. As the intermediaries
controlling money and credit, banks were in a
special position to transmit their distress to
other sectors. But the mechanism through which
banking distress mattered for the economy has
been hotly contested.
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz
(1963) saw the contraction in the money multi-
plier—driven, in their view, by panicked depos-
itors’ withdrawals of deposits—as the primary
mechanism through which banking distress af-
fected the real economy. They described the
mechanism transmitting banking distress to the
real sector as operating at the national level
through changes in the aggregate supply of
money and interest rates. Bank distress reduced
the money supply available to the public either
through the closure of banks and the consequent
freezing of bank deposits, or the withdrawals of
deposits by depositors that feared bank failure.
Ben S. Bernanke (1983), building on Fisher
(1933), emphasized the transmission of mone-
tary shocks via their effects on the balance
sheets of borrowers and on the supply of credit
by banks. Borrowers’ balance sheets were wors-
ened by debt deflation as the result of fixed
dollar debt obligations—borrowers’ net worth
and cash flow declined with the rising value of
debt service costs relative to income. Borrowers
with positive net present value projects, but
weak balance sheets, had less internally gener-
ated retained earnings to invest and could not
qualify for credit. Furthermore, Bernanke ar-
gued that the contraction of the money supply
produced contraction of nominal income and
prices relative to fixed debt service, which
weakened borrowers’ balance sheets, and in
turn, weakened banks.
Not only did firms’ financial distress reduce
the number of qualified borrowers, the contrac-
tion in banks’ net worth forced a reduction in
the supply of bank loans to qualified borrowers.
Many firms and individuals relied on banks for
credit, and as those banks suffered losses of
capital (due to asset value declines) and con-
tractions in deposits (as depositors reacted to
bank weakness by withdrawing their funds),
even borrowers with viable projects and strong
balance sheets experienced a decrease in the
effective supply of loanable funds.
Bernanke termed the combined weakening of
borrowers’ balance sheets and the contraction in
bank credit supply a rise in the “cost of credit
intermediation.” The scarcity of perfect substi-
tutes for the positive net present value invest-
ments of firms with weak balance sheets, and
for the credit supplied by existing banks, im-
plies that the weakening of firms’ and banks’
balance sheets, the disappearance of banks, and
the contraction in surviving banks’ lending
made it more difficult for the economy to chan-
nel funds to their best use. Thus, what began as
a contraction in aggregate demand became a
contraction in aggregate supply, which magni-
fied adverse economic shocks and prolonged
and deepened the Depression. The financial dis-
tress of firms and banks, and the decline in bank
lending, were not only symptoms of the Depres-
sion, but means for magnifying the shocks that
caused the Depression. Bernanke’s statistical
evidence in support of this story is derived from
time-series analysis at the national level, in
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particular his regression analysis relating bank
failures, business failures, and deflation to sub-
sequent output contraction, after taking into ac-
count money contraction.
Some have challenged Bernanke’s view em-
pirically, arguing that existing macroeconomic
time-series evidence does not necessarily indi-
cate that borrower creditworthiness and bank
credit supply were important channels for mag-
nifying shocks. Many of the empirical criti-
cisms of the Bernanke approach focus on the
difficulty of separating credit-supply shocks
from endogenous declines in the demand for
credit.1 Call the first critique the loan-demand
critique. Proponents of this critique argue that
an aggregate decline in bank credit, like that
which occurred during the Depression, does not
necessarily imply a decline in bank credit sup-
ply due to weak bank balance sheets. Instead, it
may simply indicate a lack of viable projects for
firms to pursue in a depressed economy. A
decline in bank lending may reflect a contrac-
tion in loan demand in anticipation of, or simul-
taneous with, contractions in output. Thus, the
fact that loan contraction accompanies or pre-
cedes output contraction does not necessarily
imply a causal connection running from finan-
cial distress and loan supply to output. The
loan-demand critique was a point of view that
found support during the 1930’s (see Charles O.
Hardy and Jacob Viner, 1935, and Lewis H.
Kimmel, 1939). To address the loan-demand
critique, one must identify sources of loan sup-
ply as distinct from loan demand.
A second critique of Bernanke was developed
by Hugh Rockoff (1993), which we will call the
“quality-of-money” critique. Rockoff shows
that Bernanke’s evidence of the importance of
bank and business failures for aggregate eco-
nomic activity is not robust to the inclusion of
other time-series variables in the regression.
Rockoff constructs a measure of the quality-
adjusted money supply, which takes account of
the fact that deposits in suspended banks were
not perfect substitutes for nonsuspended depos-
its as a form of money. He finds that including
his measure of quality-adjusted money in the
Bernanke empirical specification avoids any
need for additional, nonmonetary explanatory
variables. Rockoff’s point, more generally, is
that another aggregate time-series variable with
unusually large spikes confined to the same
limited periods of time as the Bernanke explan-
atory variables (1929–1933) can take explana-
tory power away from Bernanke’s measures.
The goal of this paper is to consider tests of
the Bernanke view that take into account the
loan-demand and quality-of-money critiques.
Our starting point is the insight that disaggre-
gation is a promising means of identification.
Our strategy is to devise empirical tests using
disaggregated data (at the state level and county
level) that can distinguish between Bernanke’s
interpretation of his findings and the interpreta-
tions offered by critics. The quality-of-money
critique is an argument about an aggregate ef-
fect in the market for money. By exploiting
cross-sectional variation, we are able to control
for that, and other, aggregate channels of influ-
ence. To address the loan-demand critique, we
identify local loan-supply shocks by combining
the framework developed by Bernanke (1983)
and Calomiris and Wilson (1998), which links
adverse shocks to bank condition to future bank
loan supply, with Calomiris and Mason’s
(2000) empirical analysis of the determinants of
bank distress during the Depression. We then
link loan-supply shocks to subsequent income
growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section I describes the data set. Section
II investigates the linkages at the state and
county levels between bank distress and eco-
1 We do not provide a detailed review of the various
theoretical and empirical arguments for and against the
Bernanke view. For a review of some of that literature, see
Peter Temin (1989), Calomiris (1993), Calomiris and Berry
Wilson (1998), and Ali Anari et al. (2002). The most recent
paper challenging the Bernanke view is Harold L. Cole and
Lee E. Ohanian (2000). Their evidence is indirect and of
questionable relevance to the debate over the role of bank
loan supply during the Depression. They do not model or
measure bank loan supply, but rather argue from evidence
on the deposit-output ratio that banking “services” (meaning
deposits) were not in scarce supply. In their empirical work,
they do not focus on bank lending, per se. In that sense, their
evidence is not very relevant for the debate over the role of
bank lending during the Depression. They do examine data
on interest rate and bond spreads and corporate dividends
and claim that they see little evidence of credit supply
contraction from these data. This is not the place to contest
their discussion of those data. We would simply point out
here that they only employ very indirect and aggregate
measures that they argue are linked to credit supply, broadly
defined, and that their study does not attempt to measure the
effect of bank credit supply on economic activity.
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nomic activity, describes our approach to iden-
tifying cross-sectional loan-supply shocks, and
examines the effects of cross-sectional bank
loan-supply shocks on income at the state and
county levels over the period 1930–1932. Our
county-level analysis uses the growth in build-
ing permits as an indicator of economic activity.
Section III summarizes our results and
concludes.
I. Data
Our data set is constructed from bank-level,
state-level, and county-level observations. In
this section, we describe the definitions and
sources for our data, which are summarized in
Table 1.
Our bank-level data are from the database
created by Calomiris and Mason (2000). In that
paper, we describe our method for assembling
bank-level balance sheet and income statement
data from microfilm records of “call reports” of
all Federal Reserve member banks, which we
used to forecast bank distress (see Mason, 1998,
for an overview of the call report data we col-
lected, and Calomiris and Mason, 1997, 2000,
for our results on predicting bank distress).
Calomiris and Mason (1997, 2000) find that
many characteristics of individual banks and
their local economic environments are useful
for forecasting bank distress even during peri-
ods of widespread financial distress. For our
purposes here, however, we limit our forecast-
ing variables to loan-supply instruments—vari-
ables that, on ex ante grounds, are likely to be
more closely associated with loan supply than
with loan demand. In Section II, we argue that
bank size, real estate owned relative to loans,
and bank net worth relative to assets—all mea-
sured as of December 1929—are good loan-
supply instruments.
In our state-level regression analysis, we use
bank-level data to construct only one of our
three state-level instruments. Real estate owned
relative to loans is derived from individual Fed-
eral Reserve member bank-level data from
Calomiris and Mason (2000). Bank-level data
on real estate owned relative to loans is aggre-
gated at the state level by weighting each bank’s
observation by its proportion of Fed member
TABLE 1—VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL MEANS
Annual state-level and county-level data Level N Mean
Standard
deviation
Growth in production income over relevant period
(log difference)
State 47 0.473 0.089
Growth in bank deposits from end of 1930 to end State 47 0.367 0.180
of 1932 (log difference) County 116 0.344 0.234
Growth in bank loans from end of 1930 to end of
1932 (log difference)
State 47 0.430 0.179
Growth in liabilities of failed businesses over
relevant period (log difference)
State 47 0.196 0.529
Growth in building permits over relevant period State 45 1.380 0.490
(log difference) County 116 1.526 0.645
Growth in total value of building permits granted
from fourth quarter 1928 to fourth quarter 1929
(log difference)
County 116 0.365 0.631
log(total bank assets in 1929) State 47 6.655 0.794
County 116 15.285 0.968
Real estate owned in 1929/noncash assets in 1929 State 48 0.011 0.008
County 116 0.009 0.010
(Capital  surplus  undivided profits  State 47 0.339 0.197
contingency reserve in 1929)/total assets in 1929 County 116 0.143 0.035
Value of new building permits within the state for
1930/state income in 1929
State 46 0.016 0.010
Liabilities of failed businesses for 1930/state
income in 1929
State 48 0.008 0.004
Note: Zero observations are omitted from summary statistics.
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bank deposits in the state. We then adjust our
state-level measures of this ratio for Fed mem-
ber banks to control for the presence of non-Fed
member banks, under the assumption that Fed
member banks and non-Fed member banks
within any state had similar ratios of real estate
owned relative to loans.
In our state-level regression analysis, the re-
maining two instruments, and additional state-
level measures of bank characteristics and
economic activity, are from other data sources.
Average bank size (assets per bank) and the
ratio of net worth to total assets are from the
Federal Reserve Board’s All Bank Statistics
(1959). This is also the source for annual state-
level data on bank loans and deposits. Annual
state-level data on production income are taken
from John A. Slaughter (1937). State-level an-
nual data on building permits and the liabilities
of commercial failures are constructed from
Bradstreet’s Weekly and Dun’s Review, respec-
tively. Annual data on liabilities of failed busi-
nesses are reported directly. Data on building
permits at the state level are not reported di-
rectly. Bradstreet’s reports monthly data on the
dollar value of new construction (building ex-
penditures for which permits are granted) for a
set of 215 cities in the United States. We ag-
gregated these up to the state level annually to
provide an annual index for each state.
Our measures of state-level deposit and loan
growth are for the period from the end of 1930
to the end of 1932, as are our measures of
state-level income. We measure bank condition
at the end of 1929, and loan, deposit, and in-
come growth from the end of 1930 until the end
of 1932. In doing so, we limit problems of
simultaneity and capture intertemporal linkages
among early bank distress and subsequent
growth in deposits, lending, and economic
activity.
We end our sample period at the end of 1932.
The trough of the Great Depression was March
1933, so that year-end 1932 approximates the
trough of the Depression, both from the stand-
point of economic activity and the health of the
banking sector (see Calomiris and Mason, 2000,
for a more complete discussion of changes in
bank condition over time).
Our county-level analysis constructs mea-
sures of our loan-supply instruments (bank asset
size, net worth to assets, and real estate owned)
by taking simple averages of individual bank-
level data for these variables within the county.
County-level data on bank loans are not avail-
able from any source of which we are aware,
but aggregate bank deposits at the county level
are reported by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in its Data on Banks in the United
States, 1920–1936 (1992).
There are no measures of income at the
county level of which we are aware. But the
value of building permits is reported for each of
215 cities in the United States. We employ the
growth in the value of building permits from
1930 to 1932 as a measure of growth in eco-
nomic activity in the county in which that city is
located.2 It is difficult to know how closely
building permits track overall economic activ-
ity. Building permit data are not available at the
state level, to our knowledge, and in many states
an aggregation of building permits data from
major cities would likely give a distorted picture
of building activity for the state as a whole
(particularly, for agricultural states). Given
these problems, we are encouraged by the fact
that the correlation between annual state income
growth and the state-level aggregate of annual
growth in the value of city building permits is
reasonably high during our sample period
(0.54).
2 For 49 of the 215 cities for which monthly building
permits data are reported, Bradstreet’s reports incomplete
data (that is, one or more months in which no data are
given). It is not clear whether the value of building permits
was zero in these months or simply not reported. In some
cases, some cities did report zero values for monthly build-
ing permits, thus the failure to report the data may be
indicative of missing data rather than no building permits. In
the state-level, annual building permit aggregates, we treat
missing values as zeros because missing values are rare and
the errors induced from the absence of data are likely to
have a small effect on state-level aggregates. In the county-
level data, however, we omit these cities and their surround-
ing counties from our analysis, since we lack confidence in
our county-level measures for those counties. For 33
other cities, we experienced various idiosyncratic prob-
lems matching cities to counties in a comparable way,
and so we omitted those cities and counties from our
county-level analysis as well. Eighteen cities in our sam-
ple lie within the same counties as one or more of the
other 215 cities in the sample. In that case, we take the
sum of building permits in all cities located within a
given county as our measure of building permits in the
county. These three factors result in a county-level sam-
ple size of 116 counties.
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II. Identifying Loan-Supply Effects
Table 2 reports partial correlations from or-
dinary least-squares (OLS) regressions that re-
late state-level income growth—measured from
the end of 1930 to the end of 1932—to state-
level deposit growth, loan growth, building ac-
tivity, and business failures over the period
from the end of 1930 to the end of 1932. As
Table 2 shows, state-level deposit and loan
growth during 1931 and 1932 are associated
with income growth, even after controlling
for lagged income growth (during 1930) and
for contemporaneous building activity and
business failures (which also have significant
partial correlations with state-level income
growth).3
These OLS regressions provide evidence of
association between state-level variation in
bank deposits or loans and state-level variation
in income that cannot be explained by the
quality-of-money critique. That critique relies
upon a monetary interpretation of the transmis-
sion mechanism of shocks during the Great
Depression in which the quality-adjusted aggre-
gate money supply displaces the aggregate sup-
ply of bank loans as an explanatory variable.
While variation in loan supply and demand, and
in money demand, should be associated with
variation in income locally as well as in the
aggregate, money-supply variation is captured
by the constant term in the regressions, since it
is an aggregate influence. There was a national
market for money (in which reserves and cash
are transferred across regions easily), and thus,
there should have been no state-level variation
in the supply of money.
Under the U.S. unit banking system and dual
chartering laws (for state and national banks),
in contrast, the supply of bank credit was
local; banks located in other parts of the coun-
try (which lacked the information and cus-
tomer contacts of local banks) could not
provide perfect substitutes for local bank credit.
Thus, disaggregation within the United States
offers a promising approach for assessing the
3 In results not reported here, we also investigated inter-
temporal linkages at the state level between annual loan
growth and annual income growth using a panel VAR
regression framework with one lag. We found that loans and
income Granger cause each other.








Constant 0.294*** 0.336*** 0.282*** 0.310*** 0.300*** 0.279***
(0.036) (0.048) (0.053) (0.057) (0.054) (0.089)
Growth in production income over 0.058 0.038 0.052 0.008
1929–1930 (log difference) (0.149) (0.200) (0.142) (0.211)
Growth in bank deposits from end of 0.468*** 0.522*** 0.484***
1930 to end of 1932 (log difference) (0.073) (0.140) (0.124)
Growth in bank loans from end of 1930 0.233*** 0.403*** 0.448***
to end of 1932 (log difference) (0.080) (0.121) (0.157)
Growth in building permits over 1930– 0.004 0.017 0.609 0.961
1932 (log difference) (0.021) (0.027) (1.117) (1.670)
Growth in liabilities of failed businesses 0.022 0.038* 2.697 2.313
over 1930–1932 (log difference) (0.019) (0.025) (2.580) (3.786)
Number of observations 45 45 47 45 47 45
Adjusted R2 0.493 0.156 0.220 0.298 0.179 0.148
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. State-level income growth is defined as the growth in annual production income
between the years 1930 and 1932 (log difference). Predicting equations for loan growth and deposit growth are reported in
Table 3.
* Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
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importance of the Bernanke view because of the
geographic isolation that was peculiar to Amer-
ican banking.4
Nevertheless, the OLS regressions in Table
2 say nothing about the effects of bank loan-
supply shocks, per se, on economic activity.
Bank balance sheets may grow or shrink along-
side economic activity simply as the result of
endogenous changes in money demand or loan
demand. Identifying the loan-supply effect re-
quires one to show that influences emanating
from loan supply, per se, mattered for output.
Our approach to identifying the effects of
local loan-supply shocks is to posit loan-supply
instruments—variables that produce variation
in loan supply during the early 1930’s that is
exogenous with respect to state-level income
variation in the early 1930’s (and therefore,
unrelated to loan-demand or money-demand
shocks)—and then use those instruments to link
identified loan-supply shocks to variation in lo-
cal income.
Microeconomic evidence suggests that re-
ductions in the value of bank assets were an
important source of variation for bank loan sup-
ply. Calomiris and Mason (1997, 2000) and
Calomiris and Wilson (1998) show that adverse
shocks to banks’ asset values, combined with
depositor preferences for liquidity and low risk,
caused banks to contract the supply of loans in
the 1930’s. That evidence suggests that exoge-
nous variation in loan supply was driven in
large part by bank distress. Bank distress raised
funding costs and reduced deposits, leading
banks to reallocate assets toward cash and cur-
tail loan supply.
Not all predictors of bank distress are suitable
as loan-supply instruments. Many of the vari-
ables that forecast distress are likely to be as-
sociated with both loan-supply and loan-
demand shocks faced by a bank. For example,
local building activity, local commercial dis-
tress, and banks’ loan-to-asset ratios are predic-
tors of distress that are likely to be governed by
both loan-supply and loan-demand variation.
We identify three variables as loan-supply in-
struments: bank size, real estate owned relative
to loans (a standard measure of previous loan
foreclosures), and bank net worth relative to
total assets. All of these variables are measured
as of the end of 1929, before the shocks of the
Great Depression had produced changes in bank
loan foreclosures and net worth. Cross-sectional
variation in average bank size mainly reflects
state-level differences in banking regulation,
geography, and demography. Differences in
loan foreclosures and net worth as of 1929
mainly reflect the extent to which banks were
exposed to losses on some classes of agricul-
tural loans during the 1920’s. We assume that
none of these three measures is likely to be
correlated with loan-demand variation during
the period 1930–1932. In part, that assumption
reflects the fact that the shocks of the Great
Depression (and the loan-demand changes pro-
duced by those shocks) were not merely a con-
tinuation of the shocks of the 1920’s. If there
were serial correlation in shocks, then the case
for using the real estate owned and bank net
worth variables would be weakened. Historical
analyses of the shocks of the 1920’s and those
of the Great Depression suggest that, in fact, the
origins of these disturbances were quite differ-
ent (see Calomiris, 1992; Calomiris and Mason,
2000).5
Our approach to identifying loan supply is
summarized diagrammatically in Figure 1. The
key assumption of our analysis is the exogeneity
of the instruments. In Figure 1 this is illustrated
by the absence of arrows flowing from either
loan demand or economic activity over the pe-
riod 1930–1932 to the three loan-supply instru-
ments (bank size, the bank net worth ratio, and
real estate owned relative to assets, all in 1929).
Table 3 presents our regression results for the
first-stage regression in which the three instru-
ments predict loan and deposit growth over the
period from the end of 1930 until the end of
1932.
Table 2 reports our two-stage least-squares
regressions identifying the effect of loan supply
on income growth at the state level. Here loan
4 See Calomiris (2000) for a review of the history of unit
banking restrictions and their costs.
5 In results not reported here, we also included other
forecasting variables in our instrument list and obtained
similar results. But those other variables, although also
measured in 1929, are not as desirable as instruments. Some
of those variables include bank balance sheet ratios or
measures of contemporaneous local economic conditions,
both of which are likely to be correlated with loan demand.
942 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2003
supply is captured through the instrumented
changes in loans or deposits. In our analysis of
loan-supply effects we also include, as controls,
various measures of economic activity in 1930,
including income growth from 1929 to 1930,
liabilities of failed businesses in 1930, and
building permits in 1930.
We find that instrumented loan growth and
deposit growth (alternative measures of the
loan-supply effect) have significant explanatory
power for cross-sectional variation in state in-
come in 1930–1932. In the specifications that
include controls for income growth in 1930 and
measures of building activity and commercial
distress in 1930, the results are similar. These
results are supportive of an important lending
channel, which explains the links between
cross-sectional variation in income growth and
deposit and loan growth at the state level. Bank
distress-induced contractions in credit supply
seem to have played an important role in state-
level income growth during the Depression.
At the mean of our sample, a one-standard-
deviation (17.9 percent) decrease in loan-supply
growth over our period produced roughly a
7-percent decline in income over the same pe-
riod (using instrumented loans as the measure of
loan-supply effects). If one uses instrumented
FIGURE 1. IDENTIFYING LOAN-SUPPLY EFFECTS
TABLE 3—PREDICTING OLS REGRESSIONS,
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: STATE-LEVEL DEPOSIT GROWTH











log(total bank assets in 1929) 0.056* 0.062**
(0.035) (0.032)
Real estate owned in 3.954 8.321***
1929/noncash assets in 1929 (3.629) (3.282)
(Capital  surplus  undivided 0.232** 0.125
profits  contingency reserve
in 1929)/total assets in 1929
(0.127) (0.115)
Number of observations 47 47
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.335
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
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deposits to measure the loan-supply effect, the
analogous effect on income is a decline of
around 9 percent.
One of the limitations of our state-level
analysis is the small number of observations.
Furthermore, it is possible that state-level ag-
gregation masks important local variation in the
supply of credit and in economic activity. A
simple ANOVA analysis of deposit growth
from 1930 to 1932 at the county level indicates
that only 17 percent of the variation in county-
level deposit growth is captured by cross-
sectional variation in state-level deposit growth.
Most (83 percent) of the variation in county-
level deposit growth is attributable to within-
state variation. Figures 2 and 3 plot histograms
of the growth rate of deposits at the state and
county levels. To improve sample size, and to
check for the robustness of our findings at a
higher level of disaggregation, we investigate
the links between loan-supply shifts and eco-
nomic activity at the county level.
As discussed in Section I, building permits
(reported for 215 cities) are an indicator of
economic activity at the county level for coun-
ties in which major cities are located. Table
4 reports county-level results analogous to those
in Table 2, linking deposit growth and eco-
nomic activity over the period 1930–1932. As
Table 4 shows, deposit growth and building
permit growth are positively related at the
county level.
In Table 5, we employ county-level loan-
supply instruments, analogous to those used in
Table 3, to predict deposit growth at the county
level. We find that the net worth ratio and bank
size measure enter with the predicted positive
signs and are statistically significant as predic-
tors of deposit growth. In Table 4, two-stage
least-squares regressions analogous to those
in Table 2 are reported. We find that, as in our
state-level results, loan-supply shocks have
large and statistically significant effects on
economic activity at the county level. At the
sample mean, a loan-supply shock produc-
ing a one-standard-deviation (23.4-percent)
FIGURE 2. HISTOGRAM OF COUNTY-LEVEL DEPOSIT GROWTH DISTRIBUTION, 1930–1932
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decline in deposits results in a 67.7-percent
decline in the county-level value of build-
ing permits. The fact that the size of the
loan-supply effect is so much larger for build-
ing permits likely reflects the high cyclical
volatility of the construction sector and its
FIGURE 3. HISTOGRAM OF STATE-LEVEL DEPOSIT GROWTH DISTRIBUTION, 1930–1932
TABLE 4—OLS AND 2SLS REGRESSIONS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE:







Growth in total value of building permits 0.035 0.001
granted in county from fourth quarter of 1928
to fourth quarter of 1929 (log difference)
(0.088) (0.109)
Growth in bank deposits in county from end of 1.099*** 2.891***
1930 to end of 1932 (log difference) (0.235) (1.179)
Number of observations 116 116
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.035
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Building permit growth is defined as the growth in
total building permits granted annually between the year 1930 and 1932 (log difference).
Predicting equation for deposit growth is reported in Table 5. Sample size is explained in footnote 2.
* Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
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sensitivity to conditions in local credit
markets.
III. Conclusion
We examine the effects of banking distress
on the real sector during the Great Depression.
We investigate whether banking distress was an
important propagator of shocks that originated
elsewhere in the economy, through a loan-
supply channel.
Loan-supply instruments—forecasters of
bank distress that are not likely to be highly
correlated with loan-demand variation across
states—are useful for explaining cross-state
variation in income growth during 1931 and
1932. Our evidence indicates that variation in
the supply of bank credit explains a substan-
tial amount of the variation in state income
growth over this period. Our county-level
analysis of the effect of loan-supply shocks
on the growth in the value of building permits
over the same period corroborates the state-
level findings.
REFERENCES
Anari, Ali; Kolari, James and Mason, Joseph R.
“Bank Asset Liquidation and the Propagation
of the U.S. Great Depression.” Wharton Fi-
nancial Institutions Center (Philadelphia, PA)
Working Paper No. 02–35, August 2002.
Bernanke, Ben S. “Nonmonetary Effects of the
Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression.” American Economic Re-
view, June 1983, 73(3), pp. 257–76.
Calomiris, Charles W. “Do Vulnerable Econo-
mies Need Deposit Insurance? Lessons from
U.S. Agriculture in the 1920’s,” in Philip L.
Brock, ed., If Texas were Chile: A primer on
bank regulation. San Francisco, CA: Sequoia
Institute, 1992, pp. 237–349, 450–58.
. “Financial Factors in the Great De-
pression.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Spring 1993, 7(2), pp. 61–85.
. U.S. bank deregulation in historical
perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000.
Calomiris, Charles W. and Mason, Joseph R.
“Contagion and Bank Failures During the
Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago
Banking Panic.” American Economic Re-
view, December 1997, 87(5), pp. 863–83.
. “Causes of Bank Distress During the
Great Depression.” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (Cambridge, MA) Working
Paper No. 7919, September 2000.
Calomiris, Charles W. and Wilson, Berry. “Bank
Capital and Portfolio Management: The
1930’s ‘Capital Crunch’ and Scramble to
Shed Risk.” National Bureau of Economic
Research (Cambridge, MA) Working Paper
No. 6649, July 1998; Journal of Business
(forthcoming).
Cole, Harold L. and Ohanian, Lee E. “Re-
Examining the Contributions of Money and
Banking Shocks to the U.S. Great Depres-
sion,” in Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth
Rogoff, eds., NBER macroeconomics an-
nual 2000. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000, pp. 183–226.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Data on
banks in the United States, 1920–1936. Ann
Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research Study No.
00007, 1992.
Federal Reserve Board. All bank statistics.
Washington, DC: Board of Governors, 1959.
Fisher, Irving. “The Debt-Deflation Theory of
the Great Depression.” Econometrica, Octo-
ber 1933, 1(4), pp. 337–57.
TABLE 5—PREDICTING OLS REGRESSION,









log(total bank assets in 1929) 0.052**
(0.023)
Real estate owned in 0.701
1929/noncash assets in 1929 (2.229)
(Capital  surplus  undivided 1.263**
profits  contingency reserve
in 1929)/total assets in 1929
(0.628)
Number of observations 116
Adjusted R2 0.037
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
946 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2003
Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna J. A mon-
etary history of the United States,
1867–1960. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1963.
Hardy, Charles O. and Viner, Jacob. Report on
the availability of bank credit in the Sev-
enth Federal Reserve District. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1935.
Keynes, John M. “The Consequences to the
Banks of the Collapse of Money Values.”
Essays in persuasion. New York: W.W. Nor-
ton, 1963; previously published: 1931.
Kimmel, Lewis H. The availability of credit,
1933–1938. New York: National Industrial
Conference Board, Inc, 1939.
Mason, Joseph R. “American Banks During the
Great Depression: A New Research Agenda.”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
May/June 1998, 80(3), pp. 151–52.
. “Do Lender of Last Resort Policies
Matter? The Effects of Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation Assistance to Banks Dur-
ing the Great Depression.” Journal of
Financial Services Research, September
2000, 20(1), pp. 77–95.
Rockoff, Hugh. “The Meaning of Money in the
Great Depression.” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (Cambridge, MA) Historical
Paper No. 52, December 1993.
Slaughter, John A. Income received in the vari-
ous states, 1929–1935. New York: National
Industrial Conference Board Studies, No.
234, 1937.
Temin, Peter. Lessons from the Great Depres-
sion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.
947VOL. 93 NO. 3 CALOMIRIS AND MASON: BANK DISTRESS DURING THE DEPRESSION
This article has been cited by:
1. Simon Gilchrist, Egon Zakrajšek. 2011. Monetary Policy and Credit Supply Shocks. IMF
Economic Review 59:2, 195-232. [CrossRef]
2. Ken B. Cyree, Pinghsun Huang, James T. Lindley. 2011. The Economic Consequences of Banks’
Derivatives Use in Good Times and Bad Times. Journal of Financial Services Research .
[CrossRef]
3. R. Iyer, J.-L. Peydro. 2011. Interbank Contagion at Work: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.
Review of Financial Studies 24:4, 1337-1377. [CrossRef]
4. Barry Eichengreen. 2011. Crisis and Growth in the Advanced Economies: What We Know, What
We Do not, and What We Can Learn from the 1930s. Comparative Economic Studies . [CrossRef]
5. NAOAKI MINAMIHASHI. 2011. Credit Crunch Caused by Bank Failures and Self-Selection
Behavior in Lending Markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43:1, 133-161. [CrossRef]
6. Masami Imai, , Seitaro Takarabe. 2011. Bank Integration and Transmission of Financial Shocks:
Evidence from JapanBank Integration and Transmission of Financial Shocks: Evidence from
Japan. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3:1, 155-183. [Abstract] [View PDF article]
[PDF with links]
7. Robert D. Baller, Phil Levchak, Mark Schultz. 2010. “The Great Transformation” and Suicide:
Local and Long-Lasting Effects of 1930 Bank Suspensions. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior
40:6, 574-586. [CrossRef]
8. C. W. Calomiris. 2010. The political lessons of Depression-era banking reform. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 26:3, 540-560. [CrossRef]
9. N. Crafts, P. Fearon. 2010. Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 26:3, 285-317. [CrossRef]
10. MARK CARLSON. 2010. Alternatives for Distressed Banks during the Great Depression. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 42:2-3, 421-441. [CrossRef]
11. Barrie A. WigmoreA comparison of federal financial remediation in the great depression and
2008–2009 27, 255-303. [CrossRef]
12. Luc Laeven, Ross Levine. 2009. Bank governance, regulation and risk taking#. Journal of
Financial Economics 93:2, 259-275. [CrossRef]
13. Charles W Calomiris. 2009. The Subprime Turmoil: What's Old, What's New, and What's Next.
The Journal of Structured Finance 15:1, 6-52. [CrossRef]
14. Brandon R. Dupont. 2009. Panic in the plains: agricultural markets and the panic of 1893.
Cliometrica 3:1, 27-54. [CrossRef]
15. DANIEL PARAVISINI. 2008. Local Bank Financial Constraints and Firm Access to External
Finance. The Journal of Finance 63:5, 2161-2193. [CrossRef]
16. Asim Ijaz Khwaja, , Atif Mian. 2008. Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from
an Emerging MarketTracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging
Market. American Economic Review 98:4, 1413-1442. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with
links]
17. Peter Temin. 2008. Real Business Cycle Views of the Great Depression and Recent Events:
A Review of Timothy J. Kehoe and Edward C. Prescott's Great Depressions of the Twentieth
CenturyReal Business Cycle Views of the Great Depression and Recent Events: A Review of
Timothy J. Kehoe and Edward C. Prescott's Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century. Journal
of Economic Literature 46:3, 669-684. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
18. VIRAL V. ACHARYA, TANJU YORULMAZER. 2008. Information Contagion and Bank
Herding. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40:1, 215-231. [CrossRef]
19. R HUANG. 2007. Evaluating the real effect of bank branching deregulation: Comparing
contiguous counties across US state borders#. Journal of Financial Economics . [CrossRef]
20. Sherrill Shaffer. 2007. Aggregate concentration and the cost of systemic risk. Applied Economics
Letters 14:6, 425-428. [CrossRef]
21. Gregor W. Smith. 2006. The spectre of deflation: a review of empirical evidence. Canadian
Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'economique 39:4, 1041-1072. [CrossRef]
22. THOMAS F. CARGILL, THOMAS MAYER. 2006. The Effect of Changes in Reserve
Requirements During the 1930s: The Evidence from Nonmember Banks. The Journal of Economic
History 66:02. . [CrossRef]
23. Adam B. Ashcraft. 2005. Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced
Failure of Healthy BanksAre Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure
of Healthy Banks. American Economic Review 95:5, 1712-1730. [Abstract] [View PDF article]
[PDF with links]
24. Joseph R. Mason. 2005. A Real Options Approach to Bankruptcy Costs: Evidence from Failed
Commercial Banks During the 1990s. The Journal of Business 78:4, 1523-1554. [CrossRef]
